Service interaction design: A Hawk-Dove game based approach to managing customer expectations for oligopoly service providers by unknown
Service interaction design: A Hawk-Dove game based approach
to managing customer expectations for oligopoly service providers
Yen-Hao Hsieh & Soe-Tsyr Yuan & Hsiao-Chen Liu
Published online: 20 September 2012
# The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract In the “experience economy”, effectively deliver-
ing memorable and exciting customer experiences has be-
come a key issue for service providers. Service experience
delivery involves service encounters through which interac-
tions between service providers and customers can be
shaped into interactive artifacts managing customer expect-
ations and dynamically delivering suitable services. Service
interaction design aims to optimize customer interactions
with services to match customer expectations and yield
satisfactory service experiences. On the other hand, service
providers typically make profits and cost the priority, de-
spite knowing that high service quality can maximize satis-
faction, particularly in markets served by an oligopoly,
resulting in customers only accepting existing limited-
value services. Hence, the oligopoly market can be regarded
as a value-bounded context. Additionally, understanding
customer expectations regarding a wide range of interac-
tions is crucial to service providers selecting and designing
services that match customer expectations. Therefore, this
paper presents a service interaction design mechanism to
help oligopoly service providers systematically and effec-
tively manage customer expectations in dynamic interac-
tions, even in value-bounded contexts. The proposed
mechanism models this service interaction design problem
as a series of Hawk-Dove games that approach an evolu-
tionary stable state. The evaluation results suggest that oli-
gopoly service providers should change their mindsets and
design service interactions to manage customer expectations
associated with service delivery, not only to ensure high
satisfaction and profit but also to engage customers in co-
creating value.
Keywords Service interaction design . Service experience
delivery . Hawk-Dove game . Customer expectation
management . Oligopoly service provider
1 Introduction
Pine and Gilmore (1999) proposed that the rise of the
“experience economy” will become the main determinant
of the economic activities of service firms and customer
behaviors in the 21st Century. Figure 1 shows the four
stages in the evolution of economic value, namely commod-
ities (agrarian), goods (industrial), services (service), and
experiences (experience). In the agrarian economy, humans
use natural resources (such as water, wheat or vegetables) as
commodities to fulfill their basic needs (thirst or hunger).
During this stage, economic activity focuses on satisfying
customer physiological requirements. In contrast, the expe-
rience economy sees businesses provide customers with
particular ways to experience services or goods. The eco-
nomic activities in experience economies not only meet
customer physiological needs, but also consider their emo-
tional and psychological experiences. Accordingly, service
providers in the experience economy must understand cus-
tomer needs to provide memorable service experiences, and
meeting customer expectations is critical (Meyer and
Schwager 2007; Ojasalo 2001; Parasuraman et al. 1991;
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Pine and Gilmore 1999). Managing customer expectations
is thus essential to achieving customer satisfaction. Service
providers can define and provide competitive services that
meet customer expectations to increase market competency
(Pitt and Barbara 1994; Schurter and Towers 2006).
Service encounters can be defined as direct interactions
between service providers and customers (Lewis and
Entwistle 1990). Service experience delivery involves nu-
merous service encounters (Holmlid 2007). This study
argues that service experience delivery can be regarded as
an interactive artifact that involves process innovation and
interactive technology, and that requires responding to cus-
tomer input and possibly changing customer content or
behavior. This study developed an interaction design to
influence customer behavior by providing customers with
timely and relevant information to enable them to make in-
formed decisions, complete their work easily, or simply be
entertained (Saffer 2005). This could be further extended to
incorporate services (besides information) delivered to cus-
tomers. This study claims that interactions between service
providers and customers could be shaped into interactive
artifacts to manage customer expectations and dynamically
deliver suitable services through service encounters. This
study terms this kind of interaction design service interaction
design. Service interaction design aims to optimize customer
interactions with services to match customer expectations and
yield satisfactory service experiences.
On the other hand, an oligopoly is a common market
structure characterized by imperfect competition. Mergers
and alliances resulting from the global division of labor and
economic sluggishness have seen numerous industries be-
come oligopolies. For example, the merger of Google and
YouTube is a famous case of an oligopoly involving online
portal sites. Furthermore, Ingram Micro is the top distributor
of information-based products, with many resellers globally
(Zhao et al. 2009), and the telecommunications industry can
be considered to be an oligopoly, in which a few information
service providers (ISPs) dominate the markets for mobile and
network services. Oligopoly markets have fewer sellers than
buyers. Oligopoly service providers often dominate customer
interactions, and focus on competition rather than customers
(Hendricks and McAfee 2000, 2010). Additionally, oligopoly
service providers usually lack a long-term perspective on the
co-creation of value with customers, and force customers to
accept existing services (Hendricks and McAfee 2000, 2010).
Hence, an oligopoly market can be considered a value-
bounded context.
Customer value is highly restricted in an oligopoly market,
since oligopoly service providers may only offer customers
limited services and resources. However, oligopoly service
providers are often highly competent in delivering positive
service experiences (Ren 2007). Such service providers con-
sider costs and profits over customer satisfaction, despite
customers expressing numerous needs and making multiple
requests regarding service experiences (for example in re-
sponse to the limited range of services available to them).
However, oligopoly service providers can increase customer
satisfaction and attract more customers to use their services
through effectively managing customer expectations, increas-
ing their market share and thus profits. Restated, to maintain a
leading position in an oligopoly market, oligopoly service
providers can still manage customer expectations to maintain
a good image in the minds of their customers, even in a limited
customer value-bounded context.
Restated, oligopoly service providers can provide good
experiences and design effective customer interactions by
managing customer expectations without significantly
impacting revenue. This situation differs from the dilemma
where service providers must choose whether to increase
services or reduce prices, both of which require considering
complex issues like market share and competitors. This
study thus examines the following questions:
& Do service interaction design mechanisms exist that
oligopoly service providers can adopt to manage cus-
tomer expectations during a service experience?
& How can oligopoly service providers co-create value
with customers in a value-bounded context?
This study develops a service interaction design mecha-
nism for managing customer expectations by providing
oligopoly service providers with advice on how to meet
customer requirements in service encounters. This work
meets the following two objectives. First, it develops a
quantitative mechanism to enable service providers to mon-
itor and direct customer interactions during service encoun-
ters in a manner that manages customer expectations and
ensures customer satisfaction. Second, it conducts simula-
tion experiments to determine the effectiveness and feasi-
bility of applying the proposed mechanism to oligopoly
service providers, and to determine the extent of value co-
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Fig. 1 The progression of economic value (Pine and Gilmore 1999)
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Despite the importance of managing customer expecta-
tions, many previous investigations have examined the effect
of customer expectations on service satisfaction. These studies
used quantitative methods (such as surveys) to gather data
from service providers and customers for further analysis. To
the best of the knowledge of the authors, few studies have
addressed the issue of customer expectation management in
relation to service experience delivery, especially in oligopoly
markets, by running simulations. However, this study is the
first to use the Hawk-Dove game to solve the research prob-
lems identified above. Researchers have tended not to tackle
the specified problems for three reasons. First, customer
expectations are mental states, and thus clearly defining the
levels of customer expectations and the influences on those
expectations is challenging for both researchers and service
providers. Second, many factors (service-related operations,
employee quality, service encounter design, and so on) influ-
ence service provider delivery of service experiences in an
oligopolistic market. Researchers and service providers have
difficulty defining research boundaries and simulation param-
eters to capture practical service experience delivery in such a
market. Finally, for the above reasons, constructing a service
interaction design mechanism to understand customer expect-
ations and help deliver dynamically appropriate services in
real-time service contexts is difficult. Therefore, despite many
difficulties in addressing the above research problems and
issues, this study proposes both solutions and approaches to
overcome these obstacles.
The proposed service interaction design mechanism is
based on Hawk-Dove game theory. In an oligopolistic mar-
ket, competition between providers and customers can be
regarded as dynamic (Tan 2006). Both customers and pro-
viders seek benefits, namely satisfaction with the service
experience and maximized revenue, respectively. The situa-
tion is one of conflict, and is considered a non- zero-sum
game in which customers and providers can adopt strategies
based on cooperation or resistance. As indicated above, an
oligopolistic market is a value-bounded context in which
both service providers and customers utilize limited resour-
ces to increase values and improve the service experience
(Durham, 2004). To optimize the management of customer
expectations in a value-bounded context, the tension be-
tween customer satisfaction and cost to service providers
should be coordinated to achieve ecosystem equilibrium
(given that both customers and service providers have lim-
ited resources to improve the service process and increase
customer value). This struggle resembles that of animals
competing for resources. The Hawk-Dove game can thus
simulate both customers and service providers to identify
the optimal evolutionarily stable solutions (Berninghaus and
Ehrhart 2003). Restated, both service providers and custom-
ers can effectively use the Hawk-Dove game to plan re-
source investments and optimize customer satisfaction.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 summarizes the literature on customer expectations
and the Hawk-Dove game. Section 3 then presents the logic
for designing a system for managing customer expectations
and the service interaction design mechanism for the Hawk-
Dove game. Section 4 performs experiments to validate the
proposed mechanism. Section 5 then discusses contributions
to the service interaction design and service experience de-
livery. Finally, Section 6 discusses the findings and their
theoretical and practical implications, and also suggests fu-
ture research directions.
2 Background and related work
Customer expectation management is a central concept inthe
proposed interaction design mechanism. Service providers
designing interactive encounters develop innovative serv-
ices for customers. This study helps oligopoly service pro-
viders manage customer expectations using the Hawk-Dove
game during service experience delivery to increase custom-
er satisfaction and profits. This section thus discusses and
analyzes the importance of customer expectations and intro-
duces the Hawk-Dove game-based approach.
2.1 Customer expectation
A dual-level (desired and adequate levels), dynamic model
of customer expectations provides the optimal method for
characterizing customer expectations (Parasuraman et al.
1991). The desired and adequate expectation levels repre-
sent the service levels that the customer hopes for, and those
that are acceptable, respectively. The desired level combines
what the customer believes the product “can be” with what
they believe it “should be”. The adequate level is partially
based on the customer predicted service level. The tolerance
zone varies among customers, and even among situations
for a single customer. Initial customer expectations are re-
lated to expectation disconfirmation, the degree of which
influences customer satisfaction. Zeithaml et al. (1993) pre-
sented a conceptual framework for specifying service
expectations and elucidated customer expectations using
11 antecedent factors (transitory service intensifiers, per-
ceived service alternatives, customer self-perceived service
role, situational factors, predicted service, enduring service
intensifiers, personal needs, transitory service intensifiers,
perceived service alternatives, customer self-perceived ser-
vice role, situational factors and predicted service), which
directly and indirectly affect desired and adequate expect-
ations (as listed in Fig. 2) (Zeithaml et al. 1993). For exam-
ple, when an automobile provider produces advertisements
or contracts that explicitly promise customers it will provide
perfect maintenance service, customer expectations increase
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accordingly. Perceived service alternatives are considered,
for example: if customers can choose alternative service
providers or services, then their levels of adequate service
may increase highly. Accordingly, this work uses these
determinants of expectation to define service components
and thus manage customer expectations.
Understanding customer expectations requires service pro-
viders to successfully reach the customer franchise (Parasuraman
et al. 1991; Kurtz and Clow 1993; Rust et al. 1999; Haeckel et al.
2003). The conceptualization of multiple expectations influen-
ces service provider allocation of resources (Walker and Baker
2000). Service providers can fulfill customer expectations and
achieve customer satisfaction if they deliver services in a
manner that considers the determinants of expectation. Under-
standing customer tolerance zone is crucial to ensuring custom-
er satisfaction (Johnston 1995). Managing customer
expectations is therefore incorporated into the proposed inter-
action design mechanism, affecting service delivery and ensur-
ing customer satisfaction.
Competent service providers in an oligopoly market can
manage customer expectations by raising the adequate ex-
pectation (from Adequate to Adequate’) and stabilizing the
desired expectation to reduce the tolerance zone (as shown
in Fig. 3) and thus increase barriers to competition. For
example, since Apple uses branding and promotion to raise
customer expectations of its product, customers expect the
product to be superior to alternatives. Customer loyalty
proves that Apple has successfully managed customer
expectations by raising them, and has achieved a special
position in the computer systems market.
2.2 Hawk-Dove game
In nature, individuals must forage and sometimes fight for
food. The Hawk-Dove game represents one application of
game theory to animal behavior (Kokko et al. 2006). The
game describes the situation in which contestants can select
either an aggressive (Hawk) or non-aggressive (Dove) strate-
gy to compete for a collective resource. Hawks use every
opportunity to steal or defend food, while Doves never steal
or resist food thieves. These two birds thus comprise a poly-
morphic population. Mathematically, the Hawk-Dove game is
a non-zero summatrix game with the payoff matrix in Table 1,
where V denotes the value of the contested resource; C is the
cost of an escalated fight (Smith and Parker 1976), and the
former is assumed to be less than the latter (C > V > 0).
The payoff matrix displays four possible fight situations.
In the first case, when Hawk encounters Hawk, the winner
obtains a resource of value V while the loser bears the cost
of the fight, C, or both participants bear the cost of the fight
equally, C/2. In the second case, when Hawk meets Dove,
the Hawk monopolizes the entire resource and leaves the
Dove with nothing. In the third case, when Dove meets
Hawk, the Dove receives no resource. In the fourth and





































Fig. 2 The nature and
determinants of customer
expectations of service






Fig. 3 The objective of customer expectation management
Table 1 The basic pay-
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The relationship between Vand C is associated with differ-
ent population equilibria. Equilibrium refers to the situation
when game participants adopt the optimal combination of
strategies. By approaching equilibrium, players can optimize
resource value. In the aforementioned classic Hawk-Dove
game, if C > V > 0, then the proportion of individuals in the
population that adopts the Hawk strategy tends to equal V/C at
equilibrium. (If C < V the environment favors Hawks, but this
factor is not considered here.) Each individual considers value
and cost in strategy selection. Strategy selection may eventually
approach a stable evolutionary state (ESS). The concept of ESS
involves the characteristics of specific Nash equilibriums,
which are immune to the invasion of mutant strategies and
were developed during the 1970s (Smith and Price 1973).
ESS equilibrium has been shown strong enough to attract play-
ers who could perform better in other equilibriums, such as the
dominated equilibrium (Berninghaus and Ehrhart 2003), par-
ticularly when players who are not fully informed of the payoff
functions are unaware that they are selecting an ESS.
This study adopts the Hawk-Dove game to simulate the
costs incurred, and the value gained, by oligopoly service
providers and customers, to examine strategy selection. The
evolutionary dynamics associated with consecutive games
are considered to be based on repeated interactions between
provider and customers in service delivery, and therefore the
ESS equilibrium is used to guide strategy selection.
3 Hawk-Dove game based interaction design mechanism
This study attempts to design a service interaction design
mechanism that oligopoly service providers can use to man-
age customer expectations in service encounters. The inter-
action design mechanism is based on the Hawk-Dove game
as an analogy for interactions between providers and cus-
tomers (as described in Section 2.2).
The mechanism comprises five modules of the Hawk-
Dove game-based interaction design mechanism, namely
the context detection module, the determinant decision mod-
ule, the Hawk-Dove game module, the expectation measure-
ment module, and the solution selection module (as shown
in Fig. 4). In response to customer service requests, the
proposed mechanism detects customer behaviors and
queries their preferences. The service provider determines
the values desired by customers, and considers the circum-
stances surrounding the selection of the determinants of
expectation considered in designing the service interaction.
Following determinant selection, the mechanism calculates
how to use the determinants in service delivery and uses
customer expectations to improve service experiences. Oli-
gopoly service providers thus can adopt the effective service
components to achieve satisfactory customer service expe-
riences. The modules are described below.
This study integrated the Hawk-Dove game into an ex-
hibition service system (UESS (Hsieh and Yuan 2009))
characterized by assured delivery of a high quality service
experience, enabled by different categories of interaction
design mechanisms when interfacing with exhibition stake-
holders (visitors, exhibitors and organizers) in a location-
based services-enabled exhibition environment. Each class
of stakeholder has various goals and can influence the
others. The Hawk-Dove interaction design mechanism is
activated when the value-bounded context is observed in
the presence of oligopolistic exhibitors.
3.1 Context detection module
The context detection module is designed to identify the
environment during service delivery. Service operations
and resources must be carefully considered to optimize ser-
vice delivery performance and efficacy. The proposed mod-
ule must recognize customer feedback and behavior, which
can be immediately and accurately inputted to the mecha-
nism to modify the determinant decision module. The learn-
ing approach thus is critical to service delivery in a dynamic
context.
3.2 Determinant decision module
The determinant decision module uses useful determi-
nants to influence customer expectations based on inputs
from the context detection module, customer preferences
(such as age, brand interest, price etc.), and data from the
encounter database, including previously collected cus-
tomer data, information regarding delivered services,
and so on. This module then automatically analyzes and
converts the encounter data, customer preferences and the
key performance indicators of the organizer (KPIs) into
computable scores to yield the weight of each determi-



















Fig. 4 The Design logic
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expectations in the service context. This module selects
candidate determinants of expectation that can be adopted
to alter customer expectations regarding service delivery.
Since this work applies the proposed approach to the
exhibition service sector, one domain expert and one
researcher with over a decade of experience of this
service sector help define a reasonable range for each
weighting and parameter.
3.3 Hawk-Dove game module
The Hawk-Dove game module determines suitable deter-
minants of expectation for exploitation in service encoun-
ters. After the determinant decision module obtains the
weight of each candidate determinant of expectation,
these determinants are inputted to the Hawk-Dove game
module, which thus calculates the effective interaction
design for use in service delivery. Figure 5 displays the
procedure followed by the Hawk-Dove game module.
Based on the input data from the determinant decision
module and information on the ESS goal database and
customer requirements, the ESS goal identification com-
ponent can identify goals for customer expectations. Fi-
nally, these determinants are inputted to the solution
selection module, which is outlined below.
The Hawk-Dove game models a competitive situation
involving a shared resource, in which contestants can adopt
either an aggressive (Hawk) or passive (Dove) competitive
strategy. Mathematically, the Hawk-Dove game is a two-
player non-zero sum matrix game (Grundman et al. 2009).
This study applies the Hawk-Dove game to design interac-
tions between an oligopolistic service provider and its cus-
tomers. Either the oligopoly service provider or its customers
must attempt to maximize profits while reducing the costs of
service delivery. Not only the does the oligopoly service
provider meet customer needs at relatively high cost, but
customers must make more effort to obtain excellent service.
From this perspective, each interaction can be regarded as a
non-zero sum game.
3.3.1 Players
As noted above, experiments involving two main players
who can adopt either the Hawk or Dove strategy were
performed. Table 2 clarifies both strategies.
3.3.2 Payoff matrix of Hawk-Dove game
The payoff matrix of this Hawk-Dove game of interaction
between customers and providers is shown below (as listed in
Table 3). When a customer and service provider both select
the Dove strategy, the payoff is (Coe (p1-c1), V1 + V2). The
value V1 + V2 represents the potential benefit to the customer
in a service encounter, while the value Coe (p1-c1) represents
the profit to the provider. Table 4 defines the relevant
parameters.
As the payoff matrix indicates, a service provider not
only evaluates the profit and cost to all stakeholders in a
service encounter, but also determines the service arrange-
ment most suited to a customer. Figure 6 displays the payoff
in each encounter when a customer and provider select the
Hawk and Dove strategies, respectively. The figure also
presents the overall profits of the customer and provider,
which can be calculated by summing all payoffs in the
service encounters.
3.3.3 Environmental parameters
In using the Hawk-Dove game, this work assumes many
environmental parameters based on the research of Kokko
(Kokko et al. 2006). In each service encounter, customers
select the Hawk or Dove strategy at rate x and the interaction
with degree θ. Simultaneously, the provider adopts a strat-
egy at rate y. This interaction gives providers and customers
profits of δ1(P-C) and δ2(V-E) respectively. Consequently,
the function xyθd22 denotes the benefit gained by a customer
in a single service encounter. For service providers, a similar
function xynθd12 specifies the profit from each service en-
counter, given that the encounter involves n customers. The
provider can design a series of interactions in various
encounters during service experience delivery.












Fig. 5 Hawk-Dove game module
Table 2 The Hawk-Dove strategies considered in our interaction
design
Hawk Providers always propose the service
interaction design that cannot accommodate
the needs of customer.
Customers always resist taking the service.
Dove Providers propose the service interaction design
that can accommodate the needs of customer.
Customers accept the given service arrangement.
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Both the provider and customer can gain. This study thus
uses μT to represent the gain to the provider and μF to
represent the gain to the customer. Accordingly, the total
profit to a provider equals




The total gain by a customer is calculated similarly:




Table 5 lists the definition of each parameter.
3.3.4 Evolutionary stable state
In the equilibrium state, n customers are assumed to be
involved in a particular encounter. The oligopoly service
provider and customers share limited resources and benefits,
as represented by Eq. 3:
mF  nþ mT ¼ k ð3Þ
where k represents the total gain. The service components
are limited since the oligopoly service provider is willing to
pay a limited cost to supply service components to custom-
ers. However, customers can opt out of receiving services
from service providers if the receipt of such services
requires excessive effort. Accordingly, the service compo-
nents represent a balance that satisfies both customers and
service providers. The limitations on the designed service
components (or on the provision of services) set a bound on
the profits of the customer and oligopoly service provider. A
stable evolutionary state suggests a direction for oligopoly
service providers seeking to design interactive service
encounters. Oligopoly service providers can set different
ESSs to manage expectations to induce customers to seek
different values. For example, since oligopoly service pro-
viders wish to reduce customization costs, customers can be
asked to seek related services themselves.
Table 3 The payoff matrix of this Hawk-Dove game
Customer Dove Hawk
Provider
Dove (Coe(p1-c1), V1 + V2) (Coe (p1-c1), V1)
Hawk (Coe(p2-c2), V1 + V2-E) (Coe(p2-c2), V1-E)
Table 4 The definition of parameters of the payoff matrix
Parameter Definition
V1 The value generated from the service
V2 The benefit generated when a customer
adopts the Dove strategy
p1 The profit generated when a provider
adopts the Dove strategy
p2 The profit generated when a provider
adopts the Hawk strategy
c1 The cost generated when a provider
adopts the Dove strategy
c2 The cost generated when a provider
adopts the Hawk strategy
E The extra effort that the customer
pay for the service excellence
when the provider play Hawk strategy
Coe The coefficient indicates one over the
number of service providers
in the oligopoly market; This study
assumes one service provider
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Fig. 6 The payoff in service encounters
Table 5 The model parameters and notation
Symbol Definition
mT The total profit of the provider
μT The profit of the service tactics
the provider gained in afore-encounters
x The probability of the customer choosing
certain action strategy
y The probability of the provider choosing
certain action strategy
n The number of customers encountered in
a time unit
θ The degree of customer participating in
certain service encounter
δ1 The rate of providers making profit in
certain service solution (P-C)
mF The total profit of the customer
μF The profit the customer gained in
afore-encounters
δ2 The rate of customer gaining profit in
certain service solution (V-E)
k The total profit among customers
and providers
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The three strategies of the Evolutionarily Stable State are
defined by the cost and profit to the provider and customer,
as well as by some environmental factors.
(1) The customer always adopts the Dove strategy, “com-
pletely respecting” the service agreement and striving
to ensure excellent service.
(2) The provider always adopts the Dove strategy to ac-
commodate customer needs and expectations.
(3) In the mixed strategy, the customers “partially respect”
the service agreement and sometimes play Hawk to
prevent the provider taking their gains, and the provid-
er is forced to fulfill certain customer needs and
expectations.
The ESS can supply a provider with direction on the
design of service interactions with customers. The provider
would set various ESSs as goals in managing the expect-
ations of customers with different values. For example,
when a customer wants to control service composition, the
service provider may set the goal of the ESS to be the mixed
strategy in which the customer is free to select suitable
services. In contrast, when the provider asks the customers
to find information independently, the service provider
reduces the cost of customization while accommodating
customer desires with some loss of benefit. This study
adopts the mixed strategy (partial respect) for demonstrative
purposes.
Figure 7 illustrates the process of designing a service
interaction using the Hawk-Dove game. First, the oligopoly
service provider utilizes the determinant decision module to
determine the combination of determinants of candidate
expectation that are relevant to service delivery. Second,
the oligopoly service provider can calculate the costs and
profits of both sides to determine whether different determi-
nants can be set to realize the ESS goals of customers at
equilibrium. After identifying the proper determinants, the
mechanism exploits them in an orderly fashion using the
greedy approach, based on the weights derived from user
needs and preferences as well as the provider KPI. The
greedy approach involves arranging the determinants se-
quentially from highest to lowest weight. When the Hawk-
Dove game selects four determinants for use in service
delivery, the greedy approach arranges them sequentially
(as shown in Table 6). Figure 8 lists the results for service
delivery using the greedy approach. Restated, service pro-
viders can deliver required services to customers in each
service encounter by analyzing the payoffs to both them-
selves and customers, and with reference to ESS goals.
3.4 Solution selection module
After the Hawk-Dove game module calculates the determi-
nants to be exploited in service delivery, the solution selec-
tion module identifies the most suitable service components
for managing customer expectations in the value-bounded
context. The identification is confirmed by predicting the
effects of the chosen determinants using the expectation
measurement module, which provides both the scores of
the dual expectation measurements and appropriate expec-
tation tactics.
This work assumes that each determinant of expectation
is associated with corresponding service tactics (expectation
tactics), which are used to select suitable service compo-
nents, supporting a flexible method for delivering service





















Fig. 7 Exemplar process of the
Hawk-Dove game module
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components. The recommended product is an example of
service tactics used to represent the determinant of expecta-
tion, Word-of-Mouth.
The effects of the selected determinants on customer
mental state are evaluated to determine the feasibility of
employing the expectation measurement module (as de-
tailed in section 3.5). The expectation measurement module
can measure customer expectations in real time and in
dynamic environments that are affected by the selected
determinants.
Based on the chosen expectation tactics, the solution selec-
tion module selects service components for implementation.
When customers alter their behaviors and service encounter
points, the proposed mechanism must interact with customers
immediately and dynamically. In this case, the greedy algo-
rithm selects the optimal service components for efficient
solution identification. Selecting the optimal combination of
service components is a knapsack problem in which the
oligopoly service provider must select service components
to maximize benefits given a limited budget. The knapsack








cojyj  cot; yj 2 0; 1f g; j ¼ 1 . . . ; q;
ð4Þ
where q denotes the total number of service components, and
each service component j has cost coj and profit pj. The
oligopoly service provider determines the upper bound on
the total cost, cot, which is the sum of the costs of labor,
technology and materials. This module sets the values of yj
at yj01 if the knapsack contains service component j and at
yj00 otherwise. The greedy strategy selects the alternative
with a maximum pj/coj that fits into the knapsack.
The service components identified by the greedy strategy
may not be optimal for all implementations, but represent
the best combination that the oligopoly service provider can
identify given time constraints. Since all service compo-
nents are allocated by customers and service providers, the
oligopoly service provider can estimate costs and profits for
each service component during the first stage of service
component design. For example, when the oligopoly service
provider adopts advertising, it can evaluate the cost and the
effect of different advertisements (such as a commercial
video or customer mail-outs). Following service component
selection, this module considers the context factors (such as
the distance between booths or how crowded each booth is,
and uses this to arrange the encounters in order) to generate
a service delivery template. After the service components
are exploited in service delivery, the information obtained
by the oligopoly service providers and customers (benefit
and cost) is retrieved and fed back to the Hawk-Dove game
module.
3.5 Expectation measurement module
The expectation measurement module measures the likely
performance of the selected determinants identified by the
selection solution module by calculating the customer ex-
pectation scores. This process helps the solution selection
model choose appropriate service components. The expec-
tation measurement module is critical to determining cus-
tomer mental state (Hsieh and Yuan 2010), and ensuring the
integrity and effectiveness of the Hawk-Dove game-based
interaction design mechanism. Owing to space limitations,
the measurement model is not described in detail here.
The outputs of the expectations measurement model in-
clude the adequate expectation score, desired expectation
score and a list of recommended expectation tactics. Once
the oligopoly service provider determines actual customer
expectations based on these outputs, it can propose suitable
services to help customers achieve their business goals.
Furthermore, the list of expectation tactics, derived from a
real-time database, provides a reference. This list of appro-
priate expectation tactics can be mapped to specific service
components to affect customer expectations via the solution
selection module. After implementing the expectation tac-
tics (service components), the solution selection module
should store (the values of expectation variations and infor-
mation of providers’ capabilities in a real-time database. The
expectation measurement model can then use feedback con-
trol to reflect actual customer expectations.
3.6 Summary
The Hawk-Dove game-based interaction design mechanism
is applied to enable oligopoly service providers to deliver
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Fig. 8 The determinants exercised in accord with the greedy approach
Inf Syst Front (2014) 16:697–713 705
services that ensure customer satisfaction by managing
expectations. Initially, needs and preferences are specified
to identify customer values, and enable service providers to
design and deliver effective services during service experi-
ence delivery. Customer expectations determine customer
satisfaction during service delivery in a dynamic context.
This study applies an innovative method for enriching cus-
tomer experiences that considers customer mental state. This
work also utilizes animal behavior to mimic service inter-
actions between customers and providers. After selecting
the determinants of expectation, a greedy algorithm is adop-
ted to choose appropriate low cost and high efficiency
service components to enable customers to build a high
performance eco-system. Therefore, the Hawk-Dove game-
based interaction design mechanism can be considered a
substantial and theoretical interface design artifact, compris-
ing five core modules and using customer expectation man-
agement to answer the research questions. The following
section tests the novel mechanism using experimental
simulations.
4 Experiments and results
Design assessment is a key step in demonstrating the utility,
efficiency, and quality of a designed artifact using well
defined evaluation methods (Hevner et al. 2004). The ex-
perimental method is a design evaluation method used to
examine the designed artifact. This work tests the perfor-
mance of the Hawk-Dove game-based interaction design
mechanism by conducting four sets of experiments (for
checking the convergence of the mechanism, evaluating
performance in managing customer expectations, measuring
customer satisfaction, and evaluating mechanism perfor-
mance in terms of total payoff).
4.1 Experiments for the mechanism’s convergence check
The first set of experiments studies the number of iterations
in each simulation of the use of determinants of expectation.
When the number of iterations exceeds the threshold, the
mechanism identifies the determinant of expectation as im-
practical. This set of experiments determines the optimal
number of iterations for causing the simulation results to
converge in a particular direction.
The Hawk-Dove game is designed to achieve an evolu-
tionary balance between the various ecology approaches. In
the exhibition scenario, equilibrium is defined as total cus-
tomer profit for the scenario involving a stable oligopoly
service provider. Customer reactions to the service context
are important in designing effective customer encounter
interactions. The total payoff for customers and the oligopoly
service provider, and the strategies available for adoption by
customers, thus are considered indicators of game stability.
The experiments involve randomly setting game conditions
(such as payoff) in various games. This work simulates ten
games to examine the number of iterations within which most
games reach equilibrium. At the beginning of each game,
roughly half of all customers use the Dove strategy, while
the remainder are assigned to the Hawk strategy. This exper-
iment thus defines ten games that 1000 customers and one
oligopoly service provider must adopt within 50 iterations.
Table 7 indicates the detailed parameter settings.
In Fig. 9, the Y axis represents the percentage of custom-
ers adopting the Hawk and Dove strategies and the X axis
represents the number of iterations. Customer strategies (in
ten games – including game1, game2 and so on) may
change significantly during the first ten iterations and then
gradually evolve toward a single strategy. Consequently, a
specific strategy is best suited to each game, each with its
own conditions. The total payoffs to the customer and
oligopoly service provider also change, as shown in
Fig. 10. However, when the payoff from one strategy clearly
exceeds that from the other, and when the behavior of the
oligopoly service provider changes in response to learning,
further iterations may be required to achieve ecological
stability of both customers and oligopoly service provider
agents. As shown in Fig. 10, most games cease to evolve
after an average of ten iterations, and all converge within no
more than 40 iterations.
To efficiently simulate the exhibition context and the
behavior of customers and oligopoly service providers, this
experiment attempts to optimize the number of iterations in
the game simulation to minimize resource wastage in the
remaining game runs. From the experimental results, 10 ~
40 iterations can be used as the default number of iterations
in subsequent Hawk-Dove game simulation experiments.
4.2 Experiments related to managing customer expectations
The Hawk-Dove game-based interaction is developed to
manage customer expectations with reference to the objec-
tives of oligopolistic service providers. Since customer
expectations vary in dynamic environments, customer ster-
eotypes and their preferences should be considered. The
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second experiment aims to analyze and manage customer
expectations to refine the interaction mechanism by clarify-
ing different customer stereotypes and their preferences.
Accordingly, this experiment verifies that the Hawk-Dove
game-based interaction design mechanism is an effective
means of managing customer expectations and identifying
customer stereotypes. Expectation management is designed to
help oligopoly service providers increase their expectations of
what is adequate and stabilize their expectations of what is
desirable. Consequently, the zone of tolerance determined by
the level of desired expectation is narrowed. This experiment
exploits this mechanism to examine the effects of different
customer stereotypes on customer expectations.
Five factors (including arrival, capability, effort, request,
and subjective preference) influence customer behavior (Frei
2006). Table 8 lists various customer stereotypes. Stereotype 1
involves moderate effort; stereotype 2 makes a serious effort
to bargain with the oligopoly service provider, and stereotype
3, which is the opposite of stereotype 1, involves little effort.
This experiment not only employs the above three stereo-
types to demonstrate how the Hawk-Dove game-based in-
teraction design mechanism can be used to manage
customer expectations in service encounters, but also com-
pares the measured adequate and desired expectations of
each customer stereotype. For simplicity, this work assumes
that all customers have the same initial scores associated
with expectation states (where 3.5 means the adequate ex-
pectation while 7 indicates the desired expectation). The
Hawk-Dove game-based interaction design mechanism
organizes ten service encounters for each customer and uses
the appropriate determinants in each encounter (as listed in
Table 9). Each experiment involves three users of each
stereotype to simulate and record the changing expectations
associated with each encounter in ten runs. The results in
Figs. 11–12 are obtained by averaging the variations in user
expectations for a particular stereotype.
Figure 11 demonstrates that the adequate expectation of
stereotype 1 increases with number of encounters. For ster-
eotypes 2 and 3, the mechanism slightly increases adequate
expectations. Regarding stabilization of desired expecta-
tions, Fig. 12 also shows that customer expectations are
stable for each customer stereotype. Furthermore, with re-
spect to the goals of increasing the level of adequate expec-
tation and stabilizing the desired level, the experimental
results indicate that the mechanism was successful, particu-
larly for stereotype 1.
Stereotype 1 is frequently considered to represent the target
customers of the oligopoly market, who are generally able to
independently select the best service type since they have
requisite domain knowledge (Kuusisto 2008; Rowley 1996).
Stereotype 1 can also make more effort to become involved in
service experience delivery (Kuusisto 2008; Rowley 1996).
When stereotype 1 customers lack service choices, they may



















































































Fig. 10 The total payoff of both sides at each iteration
Table 8 Three customer stereotypes of variability
Customers Stereotype 1 Stereotype 2 Stereotype 3
Stereotypes
Indicators
Arrival often seldom seldom
Capability high medium low
Effort medium much a little
Request growth relation existence
Subjective
preference
medium, low medium, low high, medium
Table 9 The parameter settings
Item Value
Number of experimented customer stereotypes 3
Number of customers in each stereotype 3
Initial adequate expectation measurement value 3.5
Initial desired expectation measurement value 7
Number of service encounters 10
Number of runs 10
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indicate that oligopoly service providers can provide stereo-
type 1 customers with the opportunity to reflect on their needs
and become involved in service experience delivery using
interactions designed specifically to manage expectations.
The proposed mechanism can modify the determinants when
customer expectations move in the opposite direction to that
desired or exceed the expected range. Accordingly, the Hawk-
Dove game-based interaction design mechanism not only
provides customers with required services, but also reliably
manages their expectations.
4.3 Experiments for customer satisfaction
The third experiment tests whether the Hawk-Dove game-
based interaction design mechanism can deliver services that
meet customer needs. The Hawk-Dove game algorithm draws
on a fight between a hawk and a dove and is used to simulate
interactions between oligopoly service providers and custom-
ers. This experiment assesses the effectiveness of the Hawk-
Dove game-based interaction design mechanism.
Table 10 shows the payoff matrix of the proposed experi-
ment based on the concepts listed in Table 3. The recommen-
dation determinant denotes the average number of customers
who recommend a particular service component to others. A
higher recommendation means more customers enjoy and
benefit from the service. Regarding the costs of experiencing
a service, customers must spend time and effort to use a
service component. Accordingly, the customer payoff can be
calculated as the determinant profit minus the determinant
cost. Furthermore, the payoff of the oligopoly service provider
is the benefit of the determinant minus the exercise cost. After
interacting with the oligopoly service provider, customer
agents can take various steps to increase profits from service
encounters, as follows.
& Each agent compares its payoff with those of other
agents to confirm the advantage of the selected strategy
relative to those of neighboring agents. If the compari-
son reveals that a different strategy yields a larger ben-
efit, then the agents learn that strategy and adopt it in the
next iteration.
& Agents react differently in different simulation runs be-
cause they know when their payoff is significantly less
than those of the other agents. For example, after an
agent implements a service strategy (such as by follow-
ing the Dove strategy) and compares its payoff with
those of other agents, and it sees that it has paid a higher
cost than other agents that have used the Hawk strategy
in the same service encounter, that agent will reject the
service next time around.
& Each agent goes through the processes of interacting and
learning to determine when a strategy should be
changed. These processes enable agents to maximize
profit. Customers that use the Dove strategy are willing
to accept the service. The evolutionarily stable strategy
balances the strategies of the population. When most
agents in the population behave identically, the ecology
of the race can be evolutionarily stable, meaning the
selected strategy is evolutionarily stable.
& To evaluate the effect of the Hawk-Dove game-based
interaction design mechanism on customer satisfaction,
this experiment selects appropriate service components
for three customers of stereotype 1. In simulating the
customer and provider behavior, the Hawk-Dove inter-
action design mechanism dynamically arranges service
components in the visiting journey based on the chosen
expectation determinant. Maintaining generality, these
experiments used ten encounters in each journey and
established seven runs of journey arrangements as listed
in Table 11.
These experiments collect the customer satisfaction score
for each service component and average these scores for
service components arranged in a journey to indicate the
degree of customer satisfaction with each journey. The
experiments use the degrees of satisfaction of the journey
arrangements to evaluate the performance of the service
interaction mechanism in examining if the service compo-
nents dynamically arranged in service encounters are appro-
priate for customers. In contrast with the effect of the Hawk-
Dove game interaction design mechanism, the experiments













































Fig. 12 Desired level of customer expectation
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are selected randomly during each service encounter of a
journey. In these experiments, the customer reaction as
measured by satisfaction score is derived based on analysis
of the post-report of AutoTronics Taipei 2009 conducted by
the Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA)
which asked visitors to rate their impression for every ser-
vice component, with the associated scores becoming the
basis for assessing the effect of service components.
Figure 13 shows the results of customer satisfaction and
every point represents the average degree of satisfaction for
each journey of the three visitors. The curves indicate that
the degrees of satisfaction for the journeys managed by the
Hawk-Dove game based interaction mechanism (around
80 % of customer satisfaction) are higher than when the
service components are randomly assigned (around 50 % of
customer satisfaction). This indicates that the service com-
ponents could effectively fulfill customer needs in deliver-
ing customer value and services when using the Hawk-Dove
game interaction design mechanism.
4.4 Experiments for high performance of the H&D game
based interaction design mechanism
This set of experiments is designed to determine how chang-
ing visitor expectations increase stakeholder benefits
(corresponding to high performance). This set of experi-
ments evaluates the overall performance of the Hawk-
Dove game-based interaction design mechanism from a
macro perspective. A high-performance ecosystem maxi-
mizes benefit to all stakeholders (oligopoly service pro-
viders and customers). Surplus value theory (Marx 1952;
Carlsson and Davidsson 2002) is used to evaluate eco-
system performance by measuring stakeholder perceptions
of value. The equation of surplus value is as follows.
S ¼ P  C þ Vð Þ ð5Þ
where S denotes surplus value; P represents total value; C is
total spending on investments and material; V denotes
spending on labor, and (C + V) represents total cost. To
model surplus value of an exhibition, the definition of
surplus value is extended to include customer and oligopoly
service provider value and costs.
This set of experiments uses pareto optimization (Hochman
and Rodgers 1969; Sawaragi et al. 1985; Jin and Sendhoff
2008) to evaluate the performance of the Hawk-Dove game-
based interaction design mechanism in the target ecosystem.
A pareto-optimal outcome is one in which no-one is made
better off without making someone else worse off. Customer
services are supposed to be pareto-optimal solutions, obtained
via the Hawk-Dove game-based interaction design mecha-
nism, that consider various interaction design factors, includ-
ing profit and cost. The measurement model thus measures the
maximum surplus value of all stakeholders achieved using the
Hawk-Dove game-based interaction design mechanism with
the following objective functions.
Maximum : Sp ¼ Pp  C þ Vð Þp
Maximum : Sc ¼ Pc  C þ Vð Þc ð6Þ
Table 12 lists the definitions of the experimental param-
eters. Pp represents the ratio of variation in the quantity of
the zone to the original quantity of the zone, and the total
cost of implementing service components during the jour-
ney is (C + V) p. The mechanism represents the customer
satisfaction score for all service components experienced in
the delivery of a service as Pc. Finally, the total time spent
interacting with every service component in the service
encounters is represented by (C + V) c. The Hawk-Dove
game-based interaction design mechanism arranges 25 cus-
tomers. The customer satisfaction score for each encounter
Table 11 The parame-
ters setting Item Value
Number of customers 3
Number of journeys 7















































Fig. 13 Customer satisfaction of each journey
Table 10 The payoff
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minus the effort made by the customer to interact with a
service component is Sc. The variation in the size of the zone
as a proportion of the original quantity of the zone minus the
cost of implementing all service components is Sp. Twenty-
five customers with randomly assigned Sc and Sp are consid-
ered to model all possible decisions made by all other possible
mechanisms. The random rules are taken primarily from do-
main experts and practical reports. Comparing these two
groups of customers in terms of overall surplus value clarifies
the effectiveness of a Hawk-Dove game interaction design
mechanism in creating a high-performance eco-system.
Based on the results of the ecosystem evaluation exper-
iment (as shown in Fig. 14), each point represents a visitor.
(A red square represents a customer served using the pro-
posed mechanism and a blue rhombus indicates a customer
with randomly assigned values of Sc and Sp). Except for a
single square point, square points outperform rhombus
points. If any points in the rhombus group exhibit quality
performance of Sp, those same points must be associated
with poor performance of Sc. In conclusion, the simulation
results clearly indicate that the Hawk-Dove game interaction
design mechanism can not only be used to build a well-
performing ecosystem but can also benefit customers and
providers by providing pareto-optimality.
4.5 Discussion
Service interaction design is important in determining the
performance of service experience delivery. This study uses
a systematic and quantitative approach, the Hawk and Dove
game, to model service interactions between oligopoly ser-
vice providers and customers where customer expectations
are dynamically but systematically managed. Restated, ser-
vice providers consider customer expectation management
during their design of the service interaction aspects of
service experience delivery.
Traditionally, service providers have used the survey
method (questionnaires) to determine customer expecta-
tions, but only after service completion. Understanding cus-
tomer expectations in real time in service contexts is
particularly difficult for service providers who deliver serv-
ices in real time. This study presents a service interaction
mechanism, which involves customer expectations based on
elicited service-related requirements and needs. Service pro-
viders can thus provide required services based on this
information. Customers can choose to receive available
services and modify their requirements based on what they
receive. Service providers thus can dynamically provide
customers with satisfactory services by immediately analyz-
ing customer feedback to clearly understand customer
expectations in real-time service contexts. Consequently,
both service providers and customers can achieve their goals
by participating in interactive service activities.
As indicated above, customers can be grouped into nu-
merous types with different levels of expectation. Service
providers can deliver suitable services when they clearly
understand customer expectations. For instance, if a service
provider knows that a customer has low expectations of
frontline services, they can reduce the number of service
employees and devote resources to preparing other useful
services for the customer. More generally, service providers
can dynamically but effectively allocate existing resources
to provide customers with more suitable services. Service
providers do not need to provide customers with all services,
necessarily increasing the cost of service provision. Hence,
the proposed service interaction mechanism helps service
providers who can flexibly modify their service-related
resources provide services that meet customer expectations
in a cost-effective manner.
One core feature of S-D logic is the co-creation of value
by service providers and customers during service experi-
ence delivery. The proposed service interaction mechanism
can be considered a platform on which service providers and
customers can co-create value. When service providers pro-
vide services to customers via the proposed service interac-
tion mechanism, customers can participate in the service
activities to improve their own service experience. Custom-












Fig. 14 Performances of the proposed mechanism in surplus value
Table 12 The definitions of parameters in surplus value
Parameter Definition
Sp Surplus value of service providers
Pp The proportion of variation of the zone
of tolerance managed after Hawk-Dove
game based interaction design mechanism
to the original zone of tolerance (z-z’)/z
(C + V) p Providers’ participation
Sc Surplus value of customers
Pc Real customers’ responses
(C + V) c Customers’ participation
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to share the experiences and knowledge gained during ser-
vice experience delivery via the proposed service interaction
mechanism. Both service providers and customers create
value by participating in service activities. Therefore, cus-
tomer involvement is essential to successful service experi-
ence delivery.
Since the proposed service interaction mechanism is
designed to be trained and improved by the input of real-
world data, the number of training sets and parameters
requires careful consideration. In this work, experts on the
exhibition industry helped specify suitable training sets and
parameters for the experimental simulations. For example,
the numbers of training iterations required to ensure the
convergence of the HDG method and the customer expec-
tation measurement model are 40 runs and ten runs, respec-
tively. However, since the settings were only imprecisely
specified, to imitate the behavior of real-world exhibition
visitors, the parameters of the proposed service interaction
mechanism must be further tuned by increasing the inputted
visitor data. Although continuous learning and searching for
suitable parameters in real-time service contexts is necessary,
the constraints imposed on service providers by resource
limitations and costs are the main factors in terminating
training iterations.
5 Implications and conclusions
In the experience economy, service providers must design
and deliver good customer service based on understanding
customer needs. Service providers can increase customer
loyalty and thus profits by developing their capacity for
experiential design (Pullman and Gross 2004). Interactions
involved in service delivery are designed to create function-
al, purposeful, compelling, and memorable customer expe-
riences (Meyer and Schwager 2007). Additionally, customer
involvement can be considered important to the co-creation
of value with service providers. In an oligopoly market,
while service providers dominate, they must consider cus-
tomer satisfaction and develop new services. However, busi-
nesses face the dilemma of providing additional services to
satisfy customers while maintaining high profits (the pursuit
of which can risk customer discontent). This predicament
becomes serious, particularly in oligopoly markets, which
constitute a value-bounded context for customers (owing to
the low motivation of oligopoly service providers to invest
additional resources in ensuring customer happiness). To
resolve this issue in an oligopoly market, this study presents
the Hawk-Dove game interaction design mechanism to in-
crease value enjoyed by service providers and customers in
a value-bounded context using customer expectation man-
agement and service interaction design. This study not only
examined the factors that influence customer satisfaction
and the quality of the service experience, but also estab-
lished a mechanism based on expectation theory and the
Hawk-Dove game for delivering a high-quality customer
experience.
The Hawk-Dove game-based interaction design mecha-
nism not only efficiently manages customer mental states to
maximize customer satisfaction, but also dispatches appro-
priate services and provides value to customers in a value-
bounded context. Based on analysis of the experimental
results, the following conclusions can be drawn regarding
the Hawk-Dove game-based interaction design mechanism.
Service experience delivery involves service encounters
through which interactions between service providers and
their customers can be shaped into interactive artifacts man-
aging customer expectations and delivering suitable services.
Service interaction design involves optimizing customer inter-
actions with services so theymatch customer expectations and
yield satisfactory service experiences.
& The mechanism can help oligopoly service providers
dynamically interact with customers to effectively match
customer expectations and ensure satisfactory service
experiences, achieving provider business goals in a
value-bounded context.
& The mechanism can still deliver satisfactory customer
services tailored to various preferences and needs.
& The mechanism can enable oligopoly service providers
and customers to co-create value and design a high-
performance ecosystem using a theoretical and system-
atic approach.
The Hawk-Dove game-based interaction design mecha-
nism can alter the managerial perspective of an oligopoly
service provider to increase the emphasis on customer men-
tal states and co-create value with customers, rather than
merely considering profit in the context of service experi-
ence delivery. Oligopoly service providers can consider
alternative methods of serving customers based on continu-
ous interaction design.
The experimental results also help oligopoly service pro-
viders realize that effective service interactive design can
increase both customer satisfaction and profits. Oligopoly
service providers must manage limited resources and under-
stand context to deliver appropriate services and ensure
customer satisfaction - particularly for stereotype 1 custom-
ers. Additionally, oligopoly service providers can also ben-
efit from increased opportunities to involve customers,
enabling them to contribute co-creating value. Oligopoly
service providers can still significantly improve profits with-
out changing their business methods and service situations.
When the proposed mechanism is used to realize effective
and interactive service design, oligopoly service providers
can attract more customers, increase their market share and
improve service ecosystem performance.
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However, this work still suffers limitations. For instance,
to test the feasibility of the proposed mechanism, many
experimental simulations were conducted, but a real field
test still needs to be performed to validate the simulation
results and establish the mechanism as a practical system.
Accordingly, environmental variations and the results of
customer feedback should be analyzed to iteratively im-
prove the proposed approach, thus contributing to design
science. Additionally, numerous directions for possible fu-
ture research exist. First, the learning efficiency of the
proposed mechanism and ESS recognition mechanism in
the Hawk-Dove game requires further improvement. The
learning rule could be enhanced by adjusting the mechanism
used for neighbor selection and by adding saltant (or mutant)
factors to prevent its evolution into an absolute ecological
strategy because such an absolute strategy would mean an
ecological agent was unable to make strategy adjustment.
Second, since the Hawk-Dove game-based interaction design
mechanism exploits numerous preference indicators involving
the determinants of expectations, it is necessary to define
suitable rules to enable consideration of more indicators in
selecting appropriate determinants. Finally, future investiga-
tions should consider system disturbance. The mechanism can
be made to more closely match real-world situations by mod-
ifying it to receive immediate user (customer and provider)
feedback and reduce information interference
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